Working Paper Series
No 487:
What have we learned from Evolutionary Game Theory so far?
Jörgen W. Weibull ()
Abstract: Evolutionary theorizing has a long tradition in economics.
Only recently has this approach been brought into the framework of
non-cooperative game theory. Evolutionary game theory studies the
robustness of strategic behaviour with respect to evolutionary forces in
the context of games played many times in large populations of boundedly
rational agents. This new strand in economic theory has lead to new
predictions and opened up doors to other social sciences. The discussion
will be focused on the following questions: What distinguishes the
evolutionary approach from the rationalistic? What are the most important
findings in evolutionary game theory so far? What are the next challenges
for evolutionary game theory in economics?
Keywords: Game theory; Evolution; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: C70; (follow links to similar papers)
29 pages, September 16, 1997, Revised October 26, 1998
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