Working Paper Series
Jörgen W. Weibull
Evolution, Rationality and Equilibrium in Games
Abstract: Evolutionary game theory studies the robustness of
strategy profiles and sets of strategy profiles with respect to
evolutionary forces in games played repeatedly in large populations of
boundedly rational agents. The approach is macro oriented in the sense of
focusing on the strategy distribution in the interacting population(s).
Some main features of this approach are here outlined, and connections with
learning models and standard notions of game-theoretic rationality and
equilibrium are discussed. Some desiderata and results for robust long-run
predictions are considered.
Keywords: Games; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: C70; C72; (follow links to similar papers)
10 pages, October 1997
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