Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics
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Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) Working Paper Series

No 501:
Evolution with Mutations Driven by Control Costs

Jörgen W. Weibull () and Eric van Damme

Abstract: Bergin and Lipman (1996) show that the refinement effect from the random mutations in the adaptive dynamics in Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) and Young (1993) is due to restrictions on how these mutation rates vary across population states. We here model these mutation rates as endogenously determined mistake probabilities, by assuming that players at some cost or disutility can control their mistake probability, i.e., the probability of implementing another pure strategy than intented. This is shown to corroborate the result in Kandori-Mailath-Rob and Young that the risk-dominant equilibrium is selected in 2 x 2-coordination games.

Keywords: Evolution; Game theory; Mutations; (follow links to similar papers)

JEL-Codes: C70; C72; (follow links to similar papers)

15 pages, August 17, 1998

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This paper is published as:
Weibull, Jörgen W. and Eric van Damme, (2002), 'Evolution in Games with Endogenous Mistake Probabilities', Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 106, No. 2, pages 296-315

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