Working Paper Series
What Are the Gains from Pension Reform?
() and Mats Persson
Abstract: This paper presents a unified analytical framework for the
analysis of social security reform. It discusses reform along two
dimensions: Pay-As-You-Go versus fully funded on the one hand, and
actuarial versus non-actuarial on the other. Making the system more
actuarial entails a trade-off between less distorted work incentives and
intra-generational redistribution. Increasing the degree of funding entails
a trade-off between more distorted work incentives, and redistribution in
favor of future generations. If a PAYGO system already has strong actuarial
elements, the additional welfare gain from making it fully funded derives
from the possibility of portfolio diversification.
Keywords: Pension reform; social security; funded pensions; work incentives; saving; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: H55; (follow links to similar papers)
28 pages, July 5, 2000
Before downloading any of the electronic versions below
you should read our statement on
for viewing Postscript files and the
Acrobat Reader for viewing and printing pdf files.
Full text versions of the paper:
Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Elisabeth Gustafsson ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ()
or Helena Lundin ().
Design by Joachim Ekebom