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Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) Working Paper Series

No 568:
Campaigning and Ambiguity when Parties Cannot Make Credible Election Promises

Andreas Westermark ()

Abstract: This paper studies a model of how political parties use resources for campaigning to inform voters. Each party has a predetermined ideology drawn from some distribution. Parties choose a platform and campaign to inform voters about the platform. We find that, the farther away parties are from each other (on average), the less resources are spent on campaigning (on average). Thus, if parties are extreme, less information is supplied than if parties are moderate. We also show that if a public subsidy is introduced, we have policy convergence, given some mild technical restrictions on the public subsidy.  

Keywords: Political Parties; Campaigning; (follow links to similar papers)

JEL-Codes: C72; D72; D89; (follow links to similar papers)

42 pages, November 20, 2001

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This paper is published as:
Westermark, Andreas, (2004), 'Campaigning and Ambiguity when Parties Cannot Make Credible Election Promises; Published with the title Extremism, Campaigning and Ambiguity', Games and Economic Bahavior, Vol. 47, May, No. 2, pages 421-452



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