Working Paper Series
Do Mergers Result in Collusion?
() and Pehr-Johan Norbäck
Abstract: We examine coordinated effects of mergers in the Swedish
retail market for gasoline during the period 1986-2002. Despite significant
changes in market concentration and many factors conductive to
coordination, the empirical analysis shows that the level of coordination
is low. In addition, statistical tests reject the hypothesis that mergers
and acquisitions result in "coordinated effects". In particular, higher
market concentration does not result in more collusive behavior and,
consequently, the relevance of simple "checklists" in merger control can be
Keywords: Merger Control; Collusion; Coordinated Effects; Oligopolistic Dominance; Competition Policy; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: D43; L13; L41; (follow links to similar papers)
34 pages, June 14, 2004
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