Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics

Working Paper Series,
Research Institute of Industrial Economics

No 646: Sustainable Social Spending

Assar Lindbeck
Additional contact information
Assar Lindbeck: The Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Postal: P.O. Box 55665, SE-102 15 Stockholm, Sweden

Abstract: The paper discusses a number of threats to the financial sustainability of social spending: increased internationalization of national economies, gradually higher relative costs of producing a number of human services, the “graying” of the population, slower productivity growth in the private sector, low employment rates, and various types of disincentive effects related to the welfare state itself, including moral hazard. I argue that threats from gradually rising costs of providing human services and disincentive effects of welfare-state arrangements, in particular moral hazard and benefit dependency, are more difficult to deal with than the other threats. I also discuss the choice between ad hoc policy reforms and automatic adjustment mechanisms, delegated to administrative bodies, for dealing with these threats.

Keywords: Sustainable Fiscal Policy; Baumol’s Disease; Moral Hazard; Automatic Adjustment Mechanisms

JEL-codes: E62; H31; H53

Language: English

37 pages, October 24, 2005

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