Working Paper Series
Political Rents in a Non-Corrupt Democracy
() and Jonas Vlachos
Abstract: A fundamental problem in all political systems is that the
people in power may extract rents to the detriment of the general public.
In a democracy, electoral competition and information provided by the media
may keep such rent extraction at bay. We develop a simple model where rents
are decreasing in the degree of political competition and voter
information. In line with our theoretical predictions, we find that both
increased political competition and increased local media coverage
substantially reduce direct measures of legal political rents among local
governments in a non-corrupt democracy (Sweden).
Keywords: Accountability; Political Competition; Media; Political Rents; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: D72; H10; H70; (follow links to similar papers)
57 pages, February 16, 2007, Revised September 25, 2008
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- This paper is published as:
Svaleryd, Helena and Jonas Vlachos, (2009), 'Political Rents in a Non-Corrupt Democracy', Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 93, pages 355-372
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