Working Paper Series
Protection of Property Rights and Growth as Political Equilibria
Abstract: This paper presents a survey of the literature on property
rights and economic growth. It discusses different theoretical mechanisms
that relate property rights to economic development. Lack of protection of
property rights can result in slow economic growth through different
channels: expropriation of private wealth, corruption of civil servants,
excessive taxation and barriers to adoption of new technologies. The
origins of property rights are also considered. Different theories are
illustrated but more attention is paid to the “social conflict view” and
its strengths and limitations. The second part of the paper illustrates
relevant empirical works on property rights and growth.
Keywords: Institutions; Economic Development; Property Rights; Social Conflict View; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: O11; O12; O43; P14; P16; (follow links to similar papers)
47 pages, March 17, 2008
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