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Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) Working Paper Series

No 812:
The Supply Function Equilibrium and Its Policy Implications for Wholesale Electricity Auctions

Pär Holmberg () and David Newbery

Abstract: The supply function equilibrium provides a game-theoretic model of strategic bidding in oligopolistic wholesale electricity auctions. This paper presents an intuitive account of current understanding and shows how welfare losses depend on the number of firms in the market and their asymmetry. Previous results and general recommendations for divisible-good/multi-unit auctions provides guidance on the design of the auction format; setting the reservation price; the rationing rule; and restrictions on the offer curves in wholesale electricity auctions.

Keywords: Wholesale Electricity Markets; Supply Function Equilibria; Competition Policy; (follow links to similar papers)

JEL-Codes: C62; D43; D44; L94; (follow links to similar papers)

45 pages, November 5, 2009

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This paper is published as:
Holmberg, Pär and David Newbery, (2010), 'The Supply Function Equilibrium and Its Policy Implications for Wholesale Electricity Auctions', Utilities Policy, Vol. 18, December, No. 4, pages 209-226



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