S-WoPEc
 
Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics
HomeAboutSeriesSubject/JEL codesAdvanced Search
Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) Working Paper Series

No 840:
A Continuous Theory of Income Insurance

Assar Lindbeck () and Mats Persson ()

Abstract: In this paper we treat an individualís health as a continuous variable, in contrast to the traditional literature on income insurance, where it is regularly treated as a binary variable. This is not a minor technical matter; in fact, a continuous treatment of an individualís health sheds new light on the role and functioning of income insurance and makes it possible to capture a number of real-world phenomena that are not easily captured in binary models. In particular, moral hazard is not regarded as outright fraud, but as a gradual adjustment of the willingness to go to work when income insurance is available. Further, the model can easily encompass phenomena such as administrative rejection of claims and the role of social norms. It also gives a rich view of the desirability of insurance in the first place.

Keywords: Moral hazard; Disability insurance; Sick pay; Work absence; Social norms; (follow links to similar papers)

JEL-Codes: G22; H53; I38; J21; (follow links to similar papers)

44 pages, June 8, 2010

Before downloading any of the electronic versions below you should read our statement on copyright.
Download GhostScript for viewing Postscript files and the Acrobat Reader for viewing and printing pdf files.

Full text versions of the paper:

wp840.pdf    PDF-file
Download Statistics

Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Elisabeth Gustafsson ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson () or Helena Lundin ().

Programing by
Design by Joachim Ekebom

Handle: RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0840 This page was generated on 2016-10-12 00:01:31