Working Paper Series
Nicholas Economides and Joacim Tåg
Network Neutrality and Network Management Regulation: Quality of Service, Price Discrimination, and Exclusive Contracts
Abstract: We compare four approaches to network neutrality and
network management regulation in a two-sided market model: (i) no
variations in Quality of Service and no price discrimination; (ii)
variations in Quality of Service but no price discrimination; (iii)
variations in Quality of Service and price discrimination but no exclusive
contracts; and (iv) no regulation: the network operator can sell exclusive
rights to content providers. We compare the equilibrium outcomes explicitly
accounting for dynamic incentives to invest in improving the Quality of
Service offered to each content provider. We provide a ranking Quality of
Service and network operator profits across regimes.
Keywords: Network neutrality; Internet price discrimination; Exclusivity; Quality of Service; Network management; Congestion; AT&T; Verizon; Google; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: C63; D40; D42; D43; L10; L12; L13; (follow links to similar papers)
28 pages, December 5, 2011
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- This paper is published as:
Economides, Nicholas and Joacim Tåg, (2012), 'Network Neutrality and Network Management Regulation: Quality of Service, Price Discrimination, and Exclusive Contracts' in Brown, Ian (ed.) Research Handbook on Governance of the Internet, chapter 6, Edward Elgar.
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