Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics
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Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) Working Paper Series

No 1005:
International Network Competition

Thomas Tangerås () and Joacim Tåg ()

Abstract: We analyse network competition in a market with international calls. National regulatory agencies (NRAs) have incentives to set regulated termination rates above marginal cost to extract rent from international call termination. International network ownership and deregulation are alternatives to combat the incentives of NRAs to distort termination rates. We provide conditions under which each of these policies increase efficiency and aggregate welfare. Our findings provide theoretical support for recent policy initiatives by the European Commission.

Keywords: Cross-border ownership; Decentralized regulation; International markets; Network; (follow links to similar papers)

JEL-Codes: L51; L96; (follow links to similar papers)

38 pages, February 12, 2014

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This paper is published as:
Tangerås, Thomas and Joacim Tåg, (2016), 'International network competition under national regulation', International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 47, pages 152-185

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