Working Papers, Department of Economics, Lund University
The Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem Revisited
Abstract: This paper provides three short and very simple proofs of
the classical Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. The theorem is first proved in
the case with only two individuals in the economy. The many individual case
follows then from an induction argument (over the number of individuals).
The proof of the theorem is further simplified when the voting rule is
assumed to be neutral.
Keywords: voting; strategy-proofness; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: D70; (follow links to similar papers)
11 pages, March 8, 1999
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