Working Papers, Department of Economics, Lund University
Fredrik C. A. Andersson
Corporatism and Economic Performance
Abstract: This paper models corporatism as affecting both the
preferences of the parties involved as well as the rules of the game. The
analysis is conducted in a union-government game on determining wages and
unemployment benefits. The result indicates that international conditions
might be important for the functions of the concept of corporatism. It may
also serve as an explanation to the poor performance on production and
employment in some of the former so successful European corporatist states
in the 1990s. The implication of this is that corporatism might not be a
successful social organisation in the globalised economy.
Keywords: Corporatism; Interest groups; Labour unions; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: J32; J51; (follow links to similar papers)
20 pages, December 18, 2000
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