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Department of Economics, Lund University Working Papers, Department of Economics, Lund University

No 2001:10:
Choosing Bargaining Partners - An experimental study on the impact of information about income and gender

Hakan Holm () and Peter Engseld

Abstract: Ultimatum proposals and dictator donations are studied when proposers can choose the sex and income of the responder. Information about the responders' income generated strong effects in the selection of responders; subjects preferred to send proposals to low-income responders and the proposals were negatively correlated to responder income. The responders' gender did not affect proposal levels, but strong effects were observed in the selection of responders; females were much more popular than males. Hence, signals of income and sex might be at least as in important in deciding with whom to bargain as in deciding how to bargain.

Keywords: Ultimatum proposals; dictator donations; signals; income; gender; (follow links to similar papers)

JEL-Codes: C78; C90; D63; J70; (follow links to similar papers)

39 pages, July 17, 2001, Revised July 30, 2001

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This paper is published as:
Holm, Hakan and Peter Engseld, (2005), 'Choosing Bargaining Partners - An experimental study on the impact of information about income and gender', Experimental Economics, Vol. 8, September, No. 3, pages 183-216



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