Working Papers, Department of Economics, Lund University
Strategy-Proof and Fair Wages
Abstract: A fair division problem with indivisible objects, e.g.
jobs, and one divisible good (money) is considered. The individuals consume
one object and money. The class of strategy-proof and fair allocation rules
is characterized. The allocation rules in the class are like a Vickrey
auction bossy and like the Clark-Groves mechanisms in general not "budget
balanced". The efficiency loss due to fairness and strategy-proofness
becomes measurable in monetary terms. Two interpretations of the formal
model is discussed. First, it is a situation where a given sum of money has
to be distributed as wages and fair wages are to be implemented. Second, it
is as an auction model where a number of objects are simultaneously
Keywords: ndivisibilities; fairness; strategy-proofness; wages; Vickrey-auction; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: C68; C71; C78; D61; D63; D71; D78; (follow links to similar papers)
21 pages, March 9, 2004
Before downloading any of the electronic versions below
you should read our statement on
for viewing Postscript files and the
Acrobat Reader for viewing and printing pdf files.
Full text versions of the paper:
Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to David Edgerton ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ()
or Helena Lundin ().
Design by Joachim Ekebom