Working Papers, Department of Economics, Lund University
Nonlinear Pricing as a Cooperative Game
Abstract: This paper characterizes nonlinear outlay schedules that
are based on a cooperative surplus sharing game with transferable utility.
First, the pricing game is shown to be convex and, as a consequence, to
have a non-empty core. This is followed by a description of the necessary
and sufficient conditions for the envy-free core to be non-empty.
Keywords: Nonlinear Pricing; Budget-Balance; Cooperative Game; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: C71; D31; D63; D82; I38; (follow links to similar papers)
14 pages, November 5, 2004, Revised January 12, 2006
- This paper is published as:
Andersson, Tommy, (2007), 'Nonlinear Pricing as a Cooperative Game', Metroeconomica, Vol. 58, No. 4, pages 503-513
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