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Department of Economics, Lund University Working Papers, Department of Economics, Lund University

No 2004:30:
Detection Biases in Bluffing - Theory and Experiments

Håkan Holm ()

Abstract: People may be better at recognizing lies than truths or better at recognizing truths than lies. Such detection biases are analyzed theoretically and experimentally. The detection bias shrinks the equilibrium set to a unique non-pooling equilibrium, in which, the better a player is to detect lies the more often will the opponent player lie. In the experiment, subjects were telling the truth too often according to standard predictions. Other findings were a significant positive correlation between self-rated bluffing ability and actual bluffing performance. Furthermore, the subjects were more prone to lie to a woman than to a man.

Keywords: Bluffing; Game theory; Truth detection; Lie detection; Experiment; (follow links to similar papers)

JEL-Codes: C72; C91; D82; (follow links to similar papers)

45 pages, December 22, 2004, Revised January 19, 2005

This working paper has been divided into two and replaced by 2008:4 and 2008:5

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