Working Papers, Department of Economics, Lund University
No 2005:3:
StrategyProof Allocation of Multiple Public Goods
LarsGunnar Svensson ()
and Pär Torstensson
Abstract: We characterize the set of strategyproof social choice
functions (SCFs), the outcome of which are multiple public goods. The set
of feasible alternatives is a subset of a product set with a finite number
of elements. We do not require the SCFs to be ‘onto’, but instead impose
the weaker requirement that every element in each category of public goods
is attained at some preference profile. Admissible preferences are
arbitrary rankings of the goods in the various categories, while a
separability restriction concerning preferences among the various
categories is assumed. We find that the range of the SCF is uniquely
decomposed into a product set in general coarser than the original product
set, and that the SCF must be dictatorial in each component of the range.
If the range cannot be decomposed at all, the SCF is dictatorial in spite
of the separability assumption on preferences, and a form of the
GibbardSatterthwaite theorem with a restricted preference domain is
obtained.
Keywords: Strategyproof; multiple public goods; decomposability; weakly onto; componentwise dictatorial.; (follow links to similar papers)
JELCodes: D71; D78; H41; (follow links to similar papers)
16 pages, January 19, 2005, Revised February 2, 2007
The paper is forthcoming in "Social Choice and Welfare".
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 This paper is published as:

Svensson, LarsGunnar and Pär Torstensson, (2008), 'StrategyProof Allocation of Multiple Public Goods', Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 30, No. 2, pages 181196
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