Working Papers, Department of Economics, Lund University
Conditioned Actions in Strategic Coordination Games
Abstract: A simple symmetric 2 „e 2 strategic coordination game is
analyzed in an evolutionary environment under the assumption that agents
are able to condition their actions on observations made of the opponent.
Agents are assumed to be associated with a profile of characteristics, of
which all agents can make a noisy observation. Actions can be conditioned
on how the observed characteristics relates to that of their own. It is
shown that there exist feasible states under which evolutionary pressure
will transform any population conditioning its actions through a
genetically induced continuous characteristic, such as body length, into a
population conditioning its actions through Status, or how well agents have
done in previous games. It is also shown that there does not exist feasible
states by which a population conditioning its actions through Status could
be invaded by any other strategies.
Keywords: Coordination; Hawk-Dove Games; Status; Positional Concerns; Conditioned Strategies; Evolutionary Equilibrium; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: C70; C72; (follow links to similar papers)
24 pages, May 30, 2005
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