Working Papers, Department of Economics, Lund University
Evolutionary Dynamics and a Refinement of the Neutral Stability Criterion
Abstract: We introduce two refinements of the neutral stability
criterion, namely the ascending and the eroding neutrally stable strategies
(NSS). These criteria take into account how well the NSS preform against
all pure strategies in symmetric two-player games. We also present a
dynamic model which supports the refinements.
Keywords: Evolutionary dynamics; Neutrally stable strategies; ascending NSS; Eroding NSS.; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: C73; (follow links to similar papers)
23 pages, May 10, 2005
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