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Department of Economics, Lund University Working Papers, Department of Economics, Lund University

No 2005:39:
An n-person Rubinstein bargaining game

Pär Torstensson

Abstract: When Herrero (1985) extends Rubinstein's (1982) alternating-offers bargaining model to the case of three or more players any agreement can be supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) outcome, given a sufficiently large discount factor. We show that this is not the case when players demand shares for themselves instead of proposing agreements to each other. Although it is possible to rule out agreements, the majority remains to be SPE outcomes.

Keywords: Multilateral bargaining; n-person bargaining; subgame perfect equilibria; (follow links to similar papers)

JEL-Codes: C72; C78; (follow links to similar papers)

5 pages, June 19, 2005

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This paper is published as:
Torstensson, Pär, (2009), 'An n-person Rubinstein bargaining game', International Game Theory Review, Vol. 11, No. 1, pages 111-115



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