Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics
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Department of Economics, Lund University Working Papers, Department of Economics, Lund University

No 2006:11:
Non-manipulable Assignment of Individuals to Positions Revisited

Tommy Andersson () and Lars-Gunnar Svensson ()

Abstract: This paper investigates an allocation rule that fairly assigns at most one indivisible object and a monetary compensation to each agent, under the restriction that the monetary compensations do not exceed some exogenously given upper bound. A few properties of this allocation rule are stated and the main result demonstrates that the allocation rule is coalitionally strategy-proof.

Keywords: Indivisible objects; fairness; coalitionally strategy-proofness; (follow links to similar papers)

JEL-Codes: C71; C78; D63; D71; D78; (follow links to similar papers)

11 pages, May 3, 2006, Revised December 4, 2007

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This paper is published as:
Andersson, Tommy and Lars-Gunnar Svensson, (2008), 'Non-manipulable Assignment of Individuals to Positions Revisited', Mathematical Social Sciences, Vol. 56, No. 3, pages 350-354

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