Working Papers, Department of Economics, Lund University
Weakly Fair Allocations and Strategy-Proofness
() and Lars-Gunnar Svensson
Abstract: This paper investigates the problem of allocating two
types of indivisible objects among a group of agents when a priority-order
must be respected and when only restricted monetary transfers are allowed.
Since the existence of a fair allocation not generally is guaranteed due
the the restrictions on the money transfers, the concept of fairness is
weakened, and a new concept of fairness is introduced. This concept is
called weak fairness. We define an allocation rule that implements weakly
fair allocations and demonstrate that it is coalitionally strategy-proof.
In fact, it is the only coalitionally strategy-proof allocation rule that
implements a weakly fair allocation.
Keywords: Indivisibles; fairness; weak fairness; strategy-proofness; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: C71; C78; D63; D71; D78; (follow links to similar papers)
26 pages, February 21, 2007, Revised July 3, 2007
- This paper is published as:
Andersson, Tommy and Lars-Gunnar Svensson, (2008), 'Weakly Fair Allocations and Strategy-Proofness', Review of Economic Design, Vol. 11, No. 4, pages 321-338
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