Working Papers, Department of Economics, Lund University
Håkan J. Holm
Detection Biases in Bluffing
Abstract: Beliefs in signals that reveal lies or truths are
widespread. These signals may lead to a truth or lie detection bias if the
probability that such a signal is perceived by the receiver is contingent
on the truth value of the sender’s message. Such detection biases are
analyzed theoretically in a bluffing game. The detection bias shrinks the
equilibrium set to a unique non-pooling equilibrium, in which the better a
player is at detecting lies the more often the opponent player will lie.
With proper deception techniques such biases can in principle be used to
extract hidden information.
Keywords: Bluffing; Game theory; Truth detection; Lie detection; Detection bias; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: C72; D82; (follow links to similar papers)
18 pages, February 29, 2008
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