Working Papers, Department of Economics, Lund University
Free-riding on Communication: An Experimental Study
() and Håkan J. Holm
Abstract: This paper experimentally investigates free-riding
behavior on communication cost in a coordination game and finds strong
indications of such free-riding. Firstly, the subjects tend to wait for
others to send a message when communication is costly, which does not
happen when communication is costless. Secondly, the proportion of games
where no communication takes place is much higher when communication is
costly compared to when it is free. Thirdly, the form of communication also
strongly suggests free-riding.
Keywords: Free-riding; Communication; Coordination; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: C72; C91; D43; (follow links to similar papers)
18 pages, September 1, 2010, Revised March 3, 2011
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