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Department of Economics, Lund University Working Papers, Department of Economics, Lund University

No 2010:14:
An Empirical Investigation of Efficiency and Price Uniformity in Competing Auctions

Tommy Andersson (), Christer Andersson and Fredrik Andersson ()

Abstract: This paper investigates empirically a number of hypotheses that are related to efficiency and price uniformity in online competing auctions for train tickets. The data set is ideal for analyzing competing auctions since each ticket is sold in a separate auction and all auctions with identical tickets starts and ends at exactly the same time. The results unambiguously demonstrate that there is a strong relationship between efficiency and price uniformity on the one hand and the number of submitted cross-bids on the other hand. These findings are in line with what theory suggests.

Keywords: Competing auctions; Cross-bidding; Efficiency; Price uniformity; (follow links to similar papers)

JEL-Codes: D40; D44; (follow links to similar papers)

15 pages, December 9, 2010

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This paper is published as:
Andersson, Tommy, Christer Andersson and Fredrik Andersson, (2012), 'An Empirical Investigation of Efficiency and Price Uniformity in Competing Auctions', Economics Letters, Vol. 116, pages 99-102



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