S-WoPEc
 
Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics
HomeAboutSeriesSubject/JEL codesAdvanced Search
Department of Economics, Lund University Working Papers, Department of Economics, Lund University

No 2010:15:
Sets in Excess Demand in Ascending Auctions with Unit-Demand Bidders

Tommy Andersson (), Christer Andersson and Adolphus Johannes Jan Talman ()

Abstract: This paper analyzes the problem of selecting a set of items whose prices are to be updated in the next iteration in so called simple ascending auctions with unit-demand bidders. A family of sets called "sets in excess demand" is introduced, and the main results demonstrate that a simple ascending auction always terminates at the minimum Walrasian equilibrium prices if and only if the selection belongs to this family. The paper also specifies a number of properties of the family of sets in excess demand and relate previously proposed selections to it.

Keywords: Multi-item auctions; unit-demand; excess demand; algorithms; (follow links to similar papers)

JEL-Codes: C62; D44; D50; (follow links to similar papers)

15 pages, December 17, 2010, Revised June 28, 2012

Before downloading any of the electronic versions below you should read our statement on copyright.
Download GhostScript for viewing Postscript files and the Acrobat Reader for viewing and printing pdf files.

Full text versions of the paper:

WP10_15.pdf    PDF-file
Download Statistics
This paper is forthcoming as:
Andersson, Tommy, Christer Andersson and Adolphus Johannes Jan Talman, 'Sets in Excess Demand in Ascending Auctions with Unit-Demand Bidders', Annals of Operations Research.



Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to David Edgerton ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson () or Helena Lundin ().

Programing by
Design by Joachim Ekebom

Handle: RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2010_015 This page was generated on 2015-04-07 14:04:23