Working Papers, Department of Economics, Lund University
Sets in Excess Demand in Ascending Auctions with Unit-Demand Bidders
(), Christer Andersson and Adolphus Johannes Jan Talman
Abstract: This paper analyzes the problem of selecting a set of
items whose prices are to be updated in the next iteration in so called
simple ascending auctions with unit-demand bidders. A family of sets called
"sets in excess demand" is introduced, and the main results demonstrate
that a simple ascending auction always terminates at the minimum Walrasian
equilibrium prices if and only if the selection belongs to this family. The
paper also specifies a number of properties of the family of sets in excess
demand and relate previously proposed selections to it.
Keywords: Multi-item auctions; unit-demand; excess demand; algorithms; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: C62; D44; D50; (follow links to similar papers)
15 pages, December 17, 2010, Revised June 28, 2012
Before downloading any of the electronic versions below
you should read our statement on
for viewing Postscript files and the
Acrobat Reader for viewing and printing pdf files.
Full text versions of the paper:
- This paper is forthcoming as:
Andersson, Tommy, Christer Andersson and Adolphus Johannes Jan Talman, 'Sets in Excess Demand in Ascending Auctions with Unit-Demand Bidders', Annals of Operations Research.
Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to David Edgerton ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ()
or Helena Lundin ().
Design by Joachim Ekebom