Working Papers, Department of Economics, Lund University
Sealed Bid Auctions vs. Ascending Bid Auctions: An Experimental Study
(), Christer Andersson and Ola Andersson
Abstract: This paper considers the sealed bid and ascending auction,
which both identifies the minimum Walrasian equilibrium prices and where
truthful preference revelation constitutes an equilibrium. Even though
these auction formats share many theoretical properties, there are
behavioral aspects that are not easily captured. To explore this issue in
more detail, this paper experimentally investigates what role the design of
the auction format has for its outcome. The results suggest that the sealed
bid mechanism performs weakly better in all of investigated measures
(consistent reporting, efficiency etc.). In addition, we find that the
performance of the ascending auction is increasing over time, whereas the
sealed bid auction shows no such tendency.
Keywords: Auctions; Non-manipulability; Efficiency; Experiments; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: C91; D44; (follow links to similar papers)
10 pages, December 17, 2010
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Full text versions of the paper:
- This paper is published as:
Andersson, Tommy, Christer Andersson and Ola Andersson, (2013), 'Sealed Bid Auctions vs. Ascending Bid Auctions: An Experimental Study', Review of Economic Design, Vol. 17, pages 1-16
Andersson, Tommy, Christer Andersson and Ola Andersson, (2013), Sealed Bid Auctions vs. Ascending Bid Auctions: An Experimental Study, Vol. 17, Review of Economic Design.
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