Working Papers, Department of Economics, Lund University
On symmetry in the formation of stable partnerships
Abstract: In this note, we examine the connection between the
roommate model and the partnership formation model (Talman and Yang, 2011,
Journal of Mathematical Economics 47, 206-212). Upon noting that both
occasionally lack equilibria we look at the stable partnerships model, a
combination of the former models and interpretable as one with a social
planner. We find two sufficient conditions for the existence of stable
matchings in the stable partnerships model, where one relates to
efficiency, and one (the symmetry condition) to fairness. Finally, we
provide examples from the fair sharing literature on dividing common values
that satisfy the symmetry condition.
Keywords: One-sided matching; partnership formation; symmetry condition; stability; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: C62; D02; D60; (follow links to similar papers)
7 pages, September 30, 2011
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