Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics
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Department of Economics, Lund University Working Papers, Department of Economics, Lund University

No 2011:31:
The Multi-item Bisection Auction

Albin Erlanson ()

Abstract: This paper proposes an iterative sealed-bid auction for selling multiple heterogeneous items with unit-demand agents. It generalizes the single item bisection auction (Grigorieva Et. al, 2007) to the environment with multiple heterogeneous items. We show that it elicits a minimal amount of information on preferences required to find the Vickrey-Clark-Groves outcome (Clarke, 1971, Groves, 1973, Vickrey, 1961), when there are two items for sale and an arbitrary number of agents.

Keywords: Bisection Auction; Multi-item; Unit-demand; Sealed-bid; (follow links to similar papers)

JEL-Codes: C72; D44; (follow links to similar papers)

22 pages, October 7, 2011

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This paper is published as:
Erlanson, Albin, (2014), 'The Dou-Item Bisection Auction', Computational Economics, Vol. 43, January, No. 1, pages 15-31

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