Working Papers, Department of Economics, Lund University
Truth-Seeking Judgment Aggregation over Interconnected Issues
Abstract: This paper analyses the problem of aggregating judgments
over multiple interconnected issues. We enrich the model by introducing the
private information underlying individuals’ judgments. Individuals share a
common preference for reaching true collective judgments, but hold private
information about what the truth might be. Information conflicts may occur
both between and within individuals. Assuming strategic voting in a
Bayesian voting game setting, we determine the voting rules which lead to
collective judgments that efficiently incorporate all private information.
We characterize the (rare) situations in which such rules exist, as well as
the nature of these rules.
Keywords: judgment aggregation; private information; efficient information aggregation; strategic voting; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: D70; D71; (follow links to similar papers)
19 pages, November 14, 2012
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