Working Papers, Department of Economics, Lund University
Trade Preferences from a Policy Perspective
Abstract: The aim of this paper is to offer a comprehensive overview
of non-reciprocal trade preferences. Legal and economic aspects are
discussed, and in particular, focus is put on how the specific design of
preference programs influence whether or not preferences will have their
intended effects. The paper starts by summarizing the historical and legal
background of non-reciprocal trade preferences, and thereafter discusses
how preferences are intended to work from an economic point of view.
Further, the paper discusses ways to determine whether or not preferences
meet their intended targets, and outlines in some detail how preference
programs differ in their design. The question of how trade preferences
could have negative effects for recipient and non-recipient countries is
explored, and the paper concludes by discussing whether trade preferences
will be a useful policy alternative in the future.
Keywords: Unilateral trade preferences; non-reciprocal trade agreements; GSP; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: F13; F15; (follow links to similar papers)
24 pages, February 7, 2013
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