Working Papers, Department of Economics, Lund University
Lina Maria Ellegård
Divided We Fall. Conflicts of Interests Regarding Fiscal Discipline in Municipal Hierarchies
Abstract: Persistent budget deficits are commonly blamed on
irresponsible governments. However, even if the government is fiscally
responsible, the agents in charge of implementing the budget may be less
concerned about fiscal discipline. According to the survey data analyzed in
this paper, such conflicts of interests are associated with low fiscal
performance and prevail in almost half of the Swedish municipalities. The
empirical analysis points at some organizational features that may affect
the prevalence of conflicts, and also indicates that conflicts may arise
for reasons exogenous to the organization.
Keywords: local governments; fiscal discipline; conflict of interests; organization; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: D23; D71; D73; D74; D78; (follow links to similar papers)
24 pages, December 4, 2013
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