Working Papers, Department of Economics, Lund University
Strategy-Proof Package Assignment
() and Karol Szwagrzak
Abstract: We examine the strategy-proof allocation of multiple
divisible and indivisible resources; an application is the assignment of
packages of tasks, workloads, and compensations among the members of an
organization. We find that any allocation mechanism obtained by maximizing
a separably concave function over a polyhedral extension of the set of
Pareto-efficient allocations is strategy-proof. Moreover, these are the
only strategy-proof and unanimous mechanisms satisfying a coherence
property and responding well to changes in the availability of resources.
These mechanisms generalize the parametric rationing mechanisms (Peyton
Young, 1987, Mathematics of Operations Research 12 (3), 397-414.), some of
which date back to the Babylonian Talmud.
Keywords: Package assignment; Indivisible objects; Strategy-proofness; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: C70; D47; D61; D63; D70; (follow links to similar papers)
41 pages, December 13, 2013
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