Working Papers, Department of Economics, Lund University
A Hybrid Game with Conditional and Unconditional Veto Power
(), Vittoria Levati
(), Natalia Montinari
() and Chiara Nardi
Abstract: In the hybrid game, one proposer confronts two responders
with veto power: one responder can condition his decisions on his own offer
but the other cannot. We vary what the informed responder knows about the
offers as well as the uninformed responder's conflict payoff. Neither
variation affects behavior: proposers always favor informed responders, who
frequently accept minimal offers.
Keywords: Ultimatum; Yes/No game; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: C72; C92; (follow links to similar papers)
14 pages, May 19, 2014
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