S-WoPEc
 
Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics
HomeAboutSeriesSubject/JEL codesAdvanced Search
Department of Economics, Lund University Working Papers, Department of Economics, Lund University

No 2014:24:
How to Efficiently Allocate Houses under Price Controls?

Tommy Andersson (), Zaifu Yang () and Dongmo Zhang ()

Abstract: Price controls are used in many regulated markets and well recognized as the cause of market inefficiency. This paper examines a practical housing market in the presence of price controls and provides a solution to the problem of how houses should be efficiently allocated among agents through a system of prices. We demonstrate that the dynamic auction by Talman and Yang (2008) always finds a core allocation in finitely many iterations, thus resulting in a Pareto efficient outcome.

Keywords: Ascending auction; assignment market; price control; Pareto efficiency; core; (follow links to similar papers)

JEL-Codes: C71; D44; D47; (follow links to similar papers)

17 pages, June 13, 2014

Before downloading any of the electronic versions below you should read our statement on copyright.
Download GhostScript for viewing Postscript files and the Acrobat Reader for viewing and printing pdf files.

Full text versions of the paper:

wp14_24.pdf    PDF-file
Download Statistics
This paper is published as:
Andersson, Tommy, Zaifu Yang and Dongmo Zhang, (2015), 'How to Efficiently Allocate Houses under Price Controls?', Economics Letters, Vol. 130, pages 97-99



Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to David Edgerton ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson () or Helena Lundin ().

Programing by
Design by Joachim Ekebom

Handle: RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2014_024 This page was generated on 2015-06-26 17:15:48