Working Papers, Department of Economics, Lund University
How to Efficiently Allocate Houses under Price Controls?
(), Zaifu Yang
() and Dongmo Zhang
Abstract: Price controls are used in many regulated markets and well
recognized as the cause of market inefficiency. This paper examines a
practical housing market in the presence of price controls and provides a
solution to the problem of how houses should be efficiently allocated among
agents through a system of prices. We demonstrate that the dynamic auction
by Talman and Yang (2008) always finds a core allocation in finitely many
iterations, thus resulting in a Pareto efficient outcome.
Keywords: Ascending auction; assignment market; price control; Pareto efficiency; core; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: C71; D44; D47; (follow links to similar papers)
17 pages, June 13, 2014
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- This paper is published as:
Andersson, Tommy, Zaifu Yang and Dongmo Zhang, (2015), 'How to Efficiently Allocate Houses under Price Controls?', Economics Letters, Vol. 130, pages 97-99
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