Working Papers, Department of Economics, Lund University
An Algorithm for Identifying Agent-k-linked Allocations in Economies with Indivisibilities
() and Lars Ehlers
Abstract: We consider envy-free and budget-balanced rules that are
least manipulable with respect to agents counting or with respect to
utility gains, and observe that for any profile of quasi-linear
preferences, the outcome of any such least manipulable envy-free rule can
be obtained via agent-k-linked allocations. Given this observation, we
provide an algorithm for identifying agent-k-linked allocations.
Keywords: least manipulable envy-free rules; algorithm; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: C71; C78; D63; D71; D78; (follow links to similar papers)
9 pages, October 15, 2014
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