Working Papers, Department of Economics, Lund University
Overlapping Multiple Assignments
Abstract: This paper studies an allocation problem with multiple
assignments, indivisible objects, no endowments and no monetary transfers,
where a single object may be assigned to several agents as long as the set
of agents assigned the object satisfy a compatibility constraint. It is
shown that, on the domain of complete, transitive and strict preferences,
group-sorting sequential dictatorships are fully characterized by four
different combinations of coalitional strategyproofness, strategyproofness,
Pareto efficiency, non-bossiness, group-monotonicity and group-invariance.
It is also demonstrated that the characterization in Pápai (2001) of
sequential dictatorships for the case where assignments are not allowed to
overlap is contained in the main result.
Keywords: Multiple assignments; overlapping assignments; sequential dictatorship; strategyproofness; compatibility; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: D61; D63; D71; (follow links to similar papers)
31 pages, December 22, 2014
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