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Department of Economics, Lund University Working Papers, Department of Economics, Lund University

No 2015:1:
Bidding Rings: A Bargaining Approach

Kalyan Chatterjee (), Manipushpak Mitra () and Conan Mukherjee ()

Abstract: We address the issue of bidder ring formation in single and multi-unit Vickrey auctions. We address this issue in a bargaining game set up under the assumption that valuation of bidders is commonly known only amongst themselves. In the single unit case, we show that the equilibrium coalition structure can only be an order preserving r-ring, that includes the winner and the top (r-1) losers. In the multiple units case, we specify sufficient conditions for formation of an interesting class of equilibrium coalition structures, which we call single winner ring with free riding, where exactly one winner colludes with all the losers and generates maximum possible bidders' surplus, and, depending on the protocol, the remaining winners free ride either by staying alone or by colluding in pairs.

Keywords: Bidding rings; Bargaining games; Coalition formation; Auctions; (follow links to similar papers)

JEL-Codes: C71; C72; C78; D44; L41; (follow links to similar papers)

28 pages, January 16, 2015, Revised January 17, 2016

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This paper is forthcoming as:
Chatterjee, Kalyan, Manipushpak Mitra and Conan Mukherjee, 'Bidding Rings: A Bargaining Approach', Games and Economic Behavior.



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