Working Papers, Department of Economics, Lund University
Assigning Refugees to Landlords in Sweden: Efficient Stable Maximum Matchings
() and Lars Ehlers
Abstract: The member states of the European Union received 1.2
million first time asylum applications in 2015 (a doubling compared to
2014). Even if asylum will be granted for many of the refugees that made
the journey to Europe, several obstacles for successful integration remain.
This paper focuses on one of these obstacles, namely the problem of finding
housing for refugees once they have been granted asylum. In particular, the
focus is restricted to the situation in Sweden during 2015–2016 and it is
demonstrated that market design can play an important role in a partial
solution to the problem. More specifically, because almost all
accommodation options are exhausted in Sweden, the paper investigates a
matching system, closely related to the system adopted by the European NGO
"Refugees Welcome", and proposes an easy-to-implement mechanism that finds
an efficient stable maximum matching. Such matching guarantees that housing
is efficiently provided to a maximum number of refugees and that no refugee
prefers some landlord to their current match when, at the same time, that
specific landlord prefers that refugee to his current match.
Keywords: refugees; forced migration; housing markets; market design; efficient stable maximum matchings; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: C71; C78; D71; D78; F22; (follow links to similar papers)
22 pages, July 18, 2016, Revised July 11, 2017
Before downloading any of the electronic versions below
you should read our statement on
for viewing Postscript files and the
Acrobat Reader for viewing and printing pdf files.
Full text versions of the paper:
Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to David Edgerton ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ()
or Helena Lundin ().
Design by Joachim Ekebom