Working Papers, Department of Economics, Lund University
Risk and Cooperation: Experimental Evidence from Stochastic Public Good Games
() and Erik Wengström
Abstract: Outcomes in social dilemmas often have a stochastic
component. We report experimental findings from public good games with both
correlated and independent risk across players. We find that the presence
of both types of risk prevents the decay of cooperation typically observed
in the standard deterministic public good game. The results further suggest
that it is greater relative importance of social norms or warm glow giving,
rather than risk sharing opportunities that foster cooperation in our
stochastic public good game.
Keywords: risk pooling; risk sharing; social norms; linear public goods game; cooperation decay; stable cooperation; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: D03; D80; H41; (follow links to similar papers)
32 pages, March 2, 2017
Before downloading any of the electronic versions below
you should read our statement on
for viewing Postscript files and the
Acrobat Reader for viewing and printing pdf files.
Full text versions of the paper:
Files with additional material for the paper:
Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to David Edgerton ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ()
or Helena Lundin ().
Design by Joachim Ekebom