Working Papers, Department of Economics, Lund University
Toke R. Fosgaard
Cooperation, Framing and Political Attitudes
(), Lars G. Hansen
() and Erik Wengström
Abstract: This paper shows that political attitudes are linked to
cooperative behavior in an incentivized experiment with a large sample
randomly drawn from the Danish population. However, this relationship
depends on the way the experiment is framed. In the standard game in which
subjects give to a public good, contributions are the same regardless of
political attitudes. In an economically equivalent version, in which
subjects take from a public good, left-wingers cooperate significantly more
than subjects in the middle or to the right of the political spectrum.
Through simulation techniques we find that this difference in the framing
effect across political point of views is to some extent explained by
differences in beliefs and basic cooperation preferences.
Keywords: Cooperation; Social Dilemma; Political Ideology; Experiment; Simulation; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: C90; D03; H41; (follow links to similar papers)
21 pages, March 2, 2017
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