Working Papers, Department of Economics, Lund University
Martin Kaae Jensen
Evolutionary Games and Matching Rules
() and Alexandros Rigos
Abstract: This study considers evolutionary models with
non-uniformly random matching when interaction occurs in groups of n>=2
individuals. In such models, groups with different compositions of
individuals generally co-exist and the reproductive success (fitness) of a
specific strategy – and consequently long-run behavior in the population –
varies with the frequencies of different group types. These frequencies
crucially depend on the particular matching process at hand. Two new
equilibrium concepts are introduced: Nash equilibrium under a matching rule
(NEMR) and evolutionarily stable strategy under a matching rule (ESSMR).
When matching is uniformly random, these reduce to Nash equilibrium and
evolutionarily stable strategy, respectively. Several results that are
known to hold for population games under uniform random matching carry
through to our setting. In our most novel contribution, we derive results
on the efficiency of the Nash equilibria of population games and show that
for any (fixed) payoff structure, there always exists some matching rule
leading to average fitness maximization in NEMR. Finally, we provide a
series of applications to commonly studied normal-form games.
Keywords: evolutionary game theory; evolutionarily stable strategy; ESS; non-uniformly random matching; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: C72; C73; (follow links to similar papers)
27 pages, September 28, 2017
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