Working Papers, Department of Economics, Lund University
Refugee Matching as a Market Design Application
Abstract: This note contains a few brief remarks on the similarities
and differences between some standard market design applications (e.g.,
kidney exchange and school choice) and the refugee assignment problem. The
main conclusion is that the refugee assignment problem is more complex in
some dimensions than many of the standard market design applications.
Consequently, classical mechanisms cannot be used to solve the problem and
more research is needed to, e.g., understand how to model preferences, and
how to define relevant axioms and multidimensional constraints.
Keywords: forced migration; asylum seekers; refugee assignment; matching; market design; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: C78; F22; (follow links to similar papers)
6 pages, August 12, 2017
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