Discussion Paper Series in Economics, Department of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics (NHH)
Rent Sharing with Footloose Production. Foreign Ownership and Wages Revisited.
() and Morten Sæthre
Abstract: We present a bargaining model of wage and employment
determination, where we show that foreign acquisitions might hurt the
bargaining outcome of powerful unions by giving the fi rm a credible threat
to move production abroad. Using detailed data on fi rms and workers in
manufacturing, including information on union membership and foreign
ownership, we fi nd, in line with the predictions of our model, that
foreign acquisitions negatively impact the outcome of workers in highly
Keywords: Foreign acquisitions; trade unions; wages.; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: F23; J30; J51; (follow links to similar papers)
28 pages, September 16, 2014
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