Discussion Paper Series in Economics, Department of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics (NHH)
A Corporate-Crime Perspective on Fisheries: Liability Rules and Non-Compliance.
() and Linda Nøstbakken
Abstract: The existing fisheries economics literature analyzes
compliance problems by treating the fishing firm as one cohesive unit, but
in many cases, violations are committed by agents acting on behalf of a
firm. To account for this, we analyze the principal-agent relationship
within the fishing firm. In the case where the firm directly benefits from
illegal fishing, the firm must induce its crew to violate regulations
through the incentive scheme. Within this framework, we analyze how the
allocation of liability between fishing firms and crew affects quota
violations and the ability to design a socially efficient fisheries policy.
We show that without wage frictions, it does not matter whom is held
liable. However, under the commonly used share systems of remuneration,
crew liability generally yields a more efficient outcome than firm
liability. Furthermore, asset restrictions may affect the outcome under
various liability rules.
Keywords: Fisheries; enforcement; quota compliance; liability; principal-agent problem.; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: Q20; (follow links to similar papers)
50 pages, August 14, 2015
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