Discussion Papers, Department of Finance and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics (NHH)
No 2007/8:
Harmonization of Corporate Tax Systems and its Effect on Collusive Behavior
Dirk Schindler ()
and Guttorm Schjelderup ()
Abstract: We study how harmonization of corporate tax systems
affects the stability of international cartels. We show that tax base
harmonization reinforces collusive agreements, while harmonization of
corporate tax rates may destabilize or stabilize cartels. We also find that
bilateral and full harmonization to a common standard is worse from
society’s point of view than unilateral harmonization to a minimum tax
standard.
Keywords: Corporate tax systems; tacit collusion; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: H87; L10; (follow links to similar papers)
28 pages, March 1, 2007
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