Discussion Papers, Department of Finance and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics (NHH)
No 2008/1:
Efficiency Enhancing Taxation in Two-sided Markets
Hans Jarle Kind ()
, Marko Koethenbuerger ()
and Guttorm Schjelderup ()
Abstract: This paper examines the efficient provision of goods in
two-sided markets and characterizes optimal specific and ad-valorem taxes.
We show that (i) a monopoly may have too high output compared to the social
optimum; (ii) output may be reduced by imposing negative value-added taxes
(subsidy) or positive specific taxes.
Keywords: Market Structure and Pricing; Efficiency; Optimal Taxation; Incidence; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: D40; D43; H21; H22; L13; (follow links to similar papers)
15 pages, January 25, 2008
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